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Symposium:
The Multinational Enterprise as Global
Corporate Citizen,
MR. CONE*: Let's get started, if we may. The word "globalization"
finds its way into many commentaries these days, in different ways and differ-
ent connotations. Sometimes it is thought to be beneficial, and sometimes it's
thought to be harmful. We have here today four people highly qualified to talk
about this topic. The focus on the multinational enterprise, which is one of the
terms that's used for a company that does business in many jurisdictions, is the
focus of today's discussion, and whether and how multinational enterprises
function as global corporate citizens.
The four distinguished and very qualified speakers that we have here are,
in the order in which they will speak, Jos6 Alvarez of Columbia, Jim Gunder-
son of Schlumberger, Limited, probably one of the multinational enterprises in
purest multinational form.
We will have John R. MacArthur, the publisher of Harper's and the au-
thor of the book on NAFTA2 that is going into multiple editions, so I under-
stand, will speak next, then Steve Ratner, who is on the law faculty of the
University of Texas and is also at the moment on the law faculty at Columbia.
When I called Jos6 Alvarez to see if he would participate, he said, well, a
far more qualified person would be Steve Ratner, but some days you get lucky
and we have both of them here. I'm delighted.
I don't want to eat into the speakers' time. If you want to know more
about them, there are biographies in the program. I would propose that we go
directly to the program and I'll ask Professor Alvarez to start. Jos6, please.
PROF. ALVAREZ**: I'm delighted to see so many of you here, and
Professor Cone asked me to at least introduce the topic so that we all are at
least starting on the same plane. Obviously, the whole topic of multinational
enterprises raises a whole series of issues that are familiar to many of us just in
reading the papers. When we're talking about a foreign investment, are we
talking about the race to the bottom? That is, when we have liberalized invest-
ment flows, do those flows go to states or countries with lower environmental
* Sydney M. Cone, III is the C.V. Starr Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
International Law at New York Law School.
** Jos6 E. Alvarez is a Professor at Columbia Law School and a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations, the American Law Institute, the Council of the International Section of the
American Bar Association, the American Society of International Law, and the Editorial Board
of the American Journal of International Law.
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standards or lower labor standards? Is there a great "sucking sound," to quote
Ross Perot, when these corporations locate overseas?
What's the relationship between liberalized foreign investment flows and
economic development? If we're talking about gaps between the rich and
poor, are we talking about a development in terms of globalization and the
action of multinational enterprises that actually enhances economic develop-
ment in terms of gross national product, or are we talking about a development
that I believe the UN Development 3 reports is really increasing the gap be-
tween the rich and poor, not just within the developing states, but also between
the states?
Those are many of the issues. What I will be addressing in particular is
what can we learn about the particular topic here, which is the status of these
multinationals as good, global corporate citizens. We should examine their
actions and inactions with respect to the recent attempt to negotiate a global
packet on investment in the OECD,4 and I will use that as a test case for
talking more generally about the topic.
But I guess I want to put this in context further. Most of us know about -
can you all hear me if I don't rely on this? Good, okay.
The literature on international civil society is, I am sure, very familiar to
many people here. There's an increasing impact that non-governmental orga-
nizations, or NGO's, are having on international norms and institutions, and
we all know that. It's old news. NGO's have taken credit for the increased
transparency of a variety of international organizations, so that we have
NGO's to thank, at least partly, for the fact that the World Bank now has an
inspection panel to oversee some of its efforts and for the fact that there's an
increased degree of coordination within the World Bank and local NGO's with
respect to particular World Bank projects.
It's also clear that elements of international civil society have tried to
extract a price from those institutions that refuse to be responsive to their con-
cerns. So, for example, Public Citizen, the organization familiar to many of
you that Ralph Nader has been much involved in, takes credit for both the
fiasco of the 1999 WTO round in Seattle as well as the demise of the multilat-
eral agreement on investment that I will be addressing. It's also clear that
NGO's of varying stripes are changing the conduct and the results of world-
wide treaty negotiations, so we don't have to look further than the Land Mines
Convention recently or the negotiations for the establishment of an interna-
tional criminal court to see the influence, the impact, of non-governmental
organizations.
Now, for people like myself, international lawyers, many of us see this as
a revolutionary, really, shift in how international law and international institu-
tions work, including a shift in power from state to non-state actors in terms of
3. United Nations Development Program.
4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
[Vol. 21
SYMPOSIUM
success or failure, and many people praise this democratization of interna-
tional legal processes and regimes. They see in this, in the NGO's growing
impact in a number of areas, a new diversity of voices in the international
community, an openness compared to what occurs in robust democracies.
Other people criticize this, arguing that, for example, many NGO's represent
or are accountable to no one in particular, suggesting that comparisons to dem-
ocratic processes, at least internationally, are misconceived.
Now, the concept of international civil society, however, should not in
my view be restricted to NGO's. NGO's are important, I think, and we all
recognize them as important because they constitute actors that are distinct
from states and because they articulate interests that are not heard if we rely
only on governmental representatives. But I think that this is true. Both of
these things are true with respect to the subject matter of this symposium:
multinational enterprises that are engaged in commerce. Multinational enter-
prises with a diverse international or transnational presence have interests or
represent a set of interests that are not always articulated by the representatives
of states. Now, what I think is unfortunate in the literature on international
civil society is that we have lost sight of focusing on multinational enterprises
as actors in this sense, I think.
Among international lawyers these days, talk of the role of international
civil society in short is usually talk about Amnesty International, not about
Exxon or Shell. When we talk of corporate entities, the focus is likely to be on
their misdeeds, that is, with respect to human rights and environmental degra-
dation, and we will talk about many of those issues today on our panel.
But I think that what I'd like to do is focus on a particular, the multina-
tional enterprise as an actual subject, not just a mere object of attention, and I
think it merits discussion because given the collapse of alternatives to capital-
ism in many parts of the world, multinational enterprises are increasingly im-
portant. Good or ill, we have to put them back on center stage, and I think that
the title of this symposium explicitly suggests something that would be an
anathema to many people. That is that multinational enterprises are part of
civil society. I think from an academic standpoint there are many good rea-
sons to do this, to put them back on center stage. Many of the developments
that are putting NGO's back at the center of international policy debates have
the same effect with respect to multinational enterprises.
The NGO's, for example, are increasingly consulted and involved in the
work of international financial institutions and lending institutions like the
World Bank for some rather obvious reasons. Why are NGO's increasingly
important? Because those institutions, like the World Bank, are increasingly
involved in activities that used to be the domain of governments. Privitization
means that these international institutions, both with respect to particular
projects, as well as with respect to policy generally, are involved in infrastruc-
ture, public utilities, et cetera.
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There's also a second reason. Because international legal developments,
that is, agreements on trade-related investment, measures services, intellectual
property provisions of the World Trade Organization or regional agreements
such as the NAFTA, increasingly are intruding on those regulatory areas that
used to be the domain of governments and of domestic concern that NGO's
were dealing with in terms of domestic concerns. But both things, privitiza-
tion, as well as the increase in regulation at the international level, are equally
relevant with respect to multinational enterprises. With privitization, private
enterprise is being asked to assume much of what Government used to do, and
that means that private enterprise may face the same complaints that govern-
ments used to face.
Privitization, then, threatens to pit multinational enterprises directly
against NGO interests, and thus it's no surprise that, for example, human
rights suits in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act are today as likely
to target multinational enterprises, or at least try to target multinational enter-
prises, as they would Government actors.
Now, the transfer of regulatory authority, or at least the scrutiny to the
international regime, has I think increased the amount of attention that mul-
tinational enterprises need to pay attention to. That is, the question that I want
to focus on initially is whether there is an international, new international reg-
ulatory landscape that multinational enterprises have to face, and I think the
answer is clearly yes. That is, the new international regulatory landscape has
increased the number of avenues - venues - that multinational enterprises now
have to keep sight of: developments in the NAFTA, other regional economic
entities, such as Mercosur regional banks, as well as the ISO,5 which sets
international standards, the OECD, and even entities such as Unsetrop. This
alphabet soup that I'm throwing at you suggests the many different places that
multinational enterprises need to look at in terms of regulation that they will
need to focus on, so that multinational enterprises now need to pay attention to
the many international and regional tribunals throughout the world, whether
these are dealing with European integration or human rights, the law of the sea
or international criminal law.
Multinational enterprises will also need to heed an increasing number of
arbitral precedents that are being set in the NAFTA, for example, in the invest-
ment chapter of that treaty, as well as through ad hoc arbitral tribunals
throughout the world.
Now, in terms of my talk, I think I'll focus on initially what I consider to
be, from the corporate standpoint, multinational enterprises' sins of omission
with respect to such phenomena. In terms of the questions that were posed in
the brochure for this symposium, we need to ask whether multinational enter-
prises are up to being good global corporate citizens. Now, here, others will
be focusing on whether they're good corporate citizens in terms of very impor-
5. International Organization for Standardization.
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tant and significant societal dimensions, as with respect to human rights or the
environment.
I guess I want to address through one concrete example, that is, the multi-
lateral agreement on investment and its demise, a much more simple question:
Are multinational enterprises being good corporate citizens, just based on their
own corporate interests? That is, just based on the bottom line, on profits, are
they up to the new international regulatory environment? That is, a place, an
environment where the site of regulation is as likely to be outside of DC as it
is in Geneva, where the regulators that they will have to pursue are just as
likely to be federal government bureaucrats, but also bureaucrats from a multi-
tude of other countries, as well as NGO's based abroad and international civil
servants. Are they up to dealing with that whole new regulatory environment?
I think the answer is, at least to me is, I'm not so sure they are, and so I'll
start with the sins of omission with respect to the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment. To me there's very little doubt that from the corporate bottom
line, and here I'm just going to stress - - I'm not suggesting I endorse the
multilateral agreement on investment. I'm just suggesting, from the corporate
bottom line, there is no doubt that such a global packet on investment was very
much in the interests of the multinational enterprise, especially one based in
the United States.
Why? Well, had such an agreement been concluded under the OECD as
it was planned, it would have regulated some 85 percent of the world outflows
of foreign direct investment and two-thirds of its inflows. At one stroke, it
would have established the baseline for regulation among the world's richest
countries and by doing so, I think a race to the top in terms of investment rules
for the rest of the world.
If we actually look at what the draft multilateral agreement had contained
in it at the time the negotiations collapsed, I think it's fairly clear what a
colossal good deal this was from the corporate bottom line. What we have in
this agreement was a top down approach to investment regulation, unlike, for
example, the gap in services agreement where countries got to serve which
areas they would permit liberalization to occur. It would have included all
forms of investment, including portfolio investment and intellectual property.
It would have covered for national treatment and most favored nation treat-
ment all stages, including the preinvestment stage, the right to invest, as well
as violations of the investment contract itself. It would have covered all forms
of regulation: laws, regulations, administration, rules of various kinds, judicial
decisions, and by all levels of government, state and federal.
It would have covered privatization, disciplining privatization, and na-
tional treatment there. It would have applied to state monopolies, and there
were all sorts of innovations on the right of a private investor to take these
disputes directly to arbitration. That is far beyond what the bilateral invest-
ment treaties in place permit and even beyond what the NAFTA investment
chapter permits, so we have the possibility of intra measures relief, for exam-
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ple, that an investor would have achieved through that dispute settlement
clause.
And it would have disciplined considerably, that horrible word for many
multinational enterprises, performance requirements. It would have actually
said that many of these would have violated international law or at least the
treaty. But we don't need to speculate about why the multilateral agreement
would have been good for the multinational enterprise. We have pretty good
evidence that it would. That is, when the U.S. Council for International Busi-
ness canvassed its members in late 1999 and asked them what the most impor-
tant priorities would be with respect to foreign investment, the Council
members responded with two: first, the need for greater transparency in in-
vestment policies around the world, and second, to improve the means by
which governments could be held accountable for violation of these policies
and laws.
There is little doubt that the multilateral agreement on investment, which-
ever draft you look at, addresses both of these and would have gone farther
than any other instrument now in existence to standardize, make transparent
investment rules for the great bulk of all investment flows, and better still,
would have committed the most important capital importing as well as capital
exporting states to binding dispute settlement to make these rules effective and
at the discretion of the investor, as I've suggested.
Yet multinational enterprises were missing in action, or MIA, when it
comes to the multilateral agreement on investment, or the MAI. That is, the
U.S. business community was not well informed as to these negotiations as
compared to the NAFTA and did relatively little to support the effort. From
the beginning, the multinational agreement on investment and the negotiations
for it lacked the kind of business backing that was vital to getting the NAFTA
negotiated and passed through the U.S. Congress. The constituency that was
the most likely to benefit from the multilateral agreement on investment took a
back seat, while those that were opposed to the effort coalesced and organized
themselves into a formidable force.
While the U.S. business community ultimately did take some interest in
the multilateral agreement on investment, this was not true for Europe and
Japan. What were the reasons for this? One was lukewarm business enthusi-
asm, and I think it was based on an erroneous conception of what the multilat-
eral agreement on investment could have realistically accomplished. Some
multinational enterprises hoped, I think, for a tool that would remove at one
blow all the existing investment barriers in the European Union. I think they
lost sight of the intrinsic value of transparency and of dispute settlement, even
without such up front liberalization.
There were other explanations, to be sure, such as the lack of high-level
government support for these multilateral agreements. That is, this was a ne-
gotiation conducted at the low level of government bureaucracies, and the lack
of the OECD to do a good job here, the absence of the OECD to do a good job
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of selling the benefits of this to the business community. There was also per-
haps some business exhaustion after the NAFTA effort, but whatever the rea-
son, it seems clear that we have here multinational enterprises' sins of
omission from their own corporate benefit perspective, and that that was partly
to blame for the demise of these global investment negotiations.
The MNE's 6 mounted no serious counteracting effort to oppose NGO's to
oppose those governments that were most in support of investment liberaliza-
tion. It suggests to me that at least on this score, if we're looking at this and
trying to draw general lessons, that the multinational enterprises are at least
not quite ready to deal with a new international regulatory environment, as
compared to at least some NGO's, and they're certainly not ready to be vision-
ary about what that new international regulatory environment should look like.
Now, the second part of my talk is the sins of commission. The Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment also collapsed due to fears, especially within
Canada and the United States, and within some circles in France as well, that
investors would be able to use their rights in this global packet to seek investor
state arbitration and to successfully challenge sovereign progressives, as they
have begun to do under the NAFTA's investment chapter.
So that we have prominent examples, for example, Canada's withdrawal
of environmental constraints on gasoline additives, faced with a challenge
under the NAFTA investment chapter. Cases like this suggested that I think
there are some multinational enterprise sins of commission that may have has-
tened the demise of this global investment packet, and what I'd like to focus
on, just to suggest to you what some of these sins of commission might look
like, is a case, the Loewen case,7 the funeral parlor case that some you may
have heard of. It has become Exhibit 1 in Public Citizen's campaign to
demonstrate how multilateral agreements such as the one I'm talking about,
but also the WTO and the NAFTA, in the words of Public Citizen, undermine
basic U.S. laws that have, quote, "nothing to do with trade, more grandly un-
dermine U.S. democracy, the U.S. rule of law, and indeed the entire American
judicial system."
Now, if you examine Loewen's pleadings - - this is Loewen. I will talk
about it in a second. It's a pending arbitral case that is now pending under
NAFTA, but many saw it as a harbinger of what we would expect if we had
the global Multilateral Agreement on Investment in place. If you examine
Loewen's pleadings before ICSID8 - - this is the arbitral body under the
bank 9 auspices to examine investment disputes - - you will see that despite
the hyperbolic rhetoric of Public Citizen, there are some grains of truth here as
to the threats posed by Loewen's case.
6. Multinational enterprises.
7. The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3.
8. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
9. The World Bank Group.
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Let's look at those cases. I got the Loewen brief from the Justice Depart-
ment, which despite objections from Loewen said that these were public docu-
ments that they could give me under the Freedom of Information Act. Loewen
Group's claims against the U.S. Federal Government is what the case is now
going against, and it grows out of a Mississippi jury verdict for some $500
million in damages, including $400 million in punitive damages.
Now, what was the original commercial dispute that led to this jury ver-
dict? It involved three contracts between competitors in the funeral home and
funeral insurance industries. The face value of that dispute was less than $1
million, a proposed exchange of two funeral homes, value of that dispute, $2.5
million, and for a Loewen funeral insurance company that was a third part of
the claim. That value was about $4 million, so if you total up the total value of
what this commercial dispute might have been worth, it was less than $10
million.
The heart of Loewen's case before ICSID was that commercial claims
involving such a relatively paltry sum of money can never result in such a
massively disproportionate judgment, $500 million, without a serious miscar-
riage of justice. More specifically, it challenged the Mississippi jury verdict as
a denial of justice prompted by blatant appeals to discrimination against the
Canadian company based on race and nationality. It alleged that the Loewen
Group's payment-and here what Loewen did was to settle the case. It paid
$150 million to the plaintiffs and did not try to appeal to the Mississippi Su-
preme Court. Why not? Because under Mississippi law, you require an appel-
late bond in order to appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court of 125 percent
of the judgment, which would have to Loewen bankrupted the company.
And so, what they did was they settled the case and then promptly sued
under the NAFTA, as is their right, the U.S. Federal Government for an expro-
priation of property. Now, Loewen's claims are not I think on their face frivo-
lous, and in fact, if you examine their memorial, it's accompanied by the
weighty expert opinion of Sir Robert Jennings, a noted international law
scholar. And what does Sir Robert say? This is an alleged case of a govern-
ment taking of property that is extremely different from those prompted by
government decrees seizing property, and that is, I think, very different from
the typical regulatory taking that we may know from U.S. law. Sir Robert's
expert opinion suggests that a disproportionate judgment that is given by a
common law jury, even if it were to consist of purely compensatory damages,
that that judgment may be illegal under both international law and the law of
the NAFTA concerning expropriation. He argues that punitive damages that
are awarded to punish and deter can also constitute violations of the letter and
spirit of a treaty that is intended to promote and encourage investment, that an
unreasonably high appellate bond requirement as the one I just described in
Mississippi can result in a finding that local remedies have in fact been ex-
hausted, that a coerced settlement can in itself be the basis of a NAFTA claim,
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and that a manifestly perverse jury verdict may require under the NAFTA
agreement an annulment as a remedy under that agreement.
Loewen's pleadings also imply that appeals to racial or national animus
by a lawyer, if left uncorrected by a state trial judge, constitute violations of
national treatment that trigger liability for the federal government, and then, to
top it all off, the Loewen claim comes accompanied by an affidavit by a for-
mer Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and he adds
a structural argument for discrimination against the Canadian company. He
says that racial polarization characterized this case, and it pitted a white corpo-
rate defendant against a predominantly black jury that was presided over by a
judge elected from a deliberately gerrymandered black district - - I'm quoting
from the affidavit - - and this predictably produced a trial tainted by anti-
Canadian discrimination.
In this fashion, the Loewen case appears to indirectly challenge the legiti-
macy of the Federal Voting Rights Act. Surprise! As a result, what do we
have? We have a foreign tribunal operating largely in secret, and it's being
asked to decide such politically loaded issues as to whether the federal govern-
ment, and of course the federal taxpayers, are liable for mistakes of the federal
judicial system at a time when the U.S. Supreme Court seems to be leery of
letting the federal government impose financial penalties on states, under the
resurgence of new federalism jurisprudence. Arbitral proceedings that do not
permit amicus from interested third parties may be canvassing such extremely
sensitive questions that some of you may be reminded of the late, lamented
O.J. cases, that is, including the relative merits of state versus federal trials, the
legitimacy of verdicts by racially imbalanced juries, and the propriety of rea-
sonable appeals within the U.S. judicial system. A case under international
treaty then risks becoming a forum for discrediting the use of juries generally
in civil cases, for particular appellate bond requirements under state law, and
even the propriety of punitive damages.
Now, you don't have to be a friend of Public Citizen to be alarmed by the
prospect of what an incautious panel of arbitrators can do with a claim like
this, or the backlash against international arbitration that such a decision could
provoke, and I think not just among defenders of states' rights. Moreover, as
is suggested by the impact that even the threat of such a case has already had
on the negotiations for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, we don't
really need to have the ultimate arbitral decision reached in this case. That is,
in a case that says Loewen is right, that is, the result doesn't matter as much as
the fact that such challenges, international challenges, now appear to be cogni-
zable under an international agreement that is subject to binding dispute
settlement.
Now, cases like Loewen's, and there are other cases, by the way, that we
can discuss in the question and answer period, but cases like Loewen's under
NAFTA are possible because that treaty treats foreign investors essentially
like bearers of human rights in regional human rights systems. NAFTA inves-
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tors are given broad rights to fair and equitable treatment, in accord with due
process and the international minimum standard. They have a right not to be
discriminated against. Their property, broadly defined to include contractual
rights and intangible assets, cannot be taken without prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation. Like individuals that have recourse to the Court of
Human Rights at Strassburg, NAFTA investors need not exclusively rely on
their home governments or their domestic courts for protection. They have
direct access to international arbitration and can, if necessary, enforce any
judgments in national courts through the New York Convention for the En-
forcement of Arbitral Awards and similar arrangements.
Now, what lessons can we draw from the Loewen case and other cases
like this that are now pending in NAFTA? The first lesson may be that mul-
tinational enterprises who take advantage of their direct access to international
dispute settlements may be individually helping themselves at the expense of
other multinational enterprises and the interests of the business community as
a whole. There's clearly a risk that cases like Loewen's, however plausibly
based on an expressed and expansive state of the art investment agreement,
may in the end destabilize the NAFTA itself and the prospects for any further
expansion of investment liberalization via comparable treaty routes, such as
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.
Now, I concede, there's not much we can do about this problem. This is
reminiscent of the older prisoner dilemma problems in international affairs,
and the essence of investor-state dispute settlement is precisely to have indi-
vidual investors, not their home governments, in the drivers seat. So these
kind of cases may be the price we pay for direct access to arbitration.
But there's a second lesson here buried in the Loewen case, and that is to
remind us of the hidden virtues of other approaches to international dispute
settlement. While multinational enterprises frequently complain about their
lack of direct access to, for example, the WTO forms of dispute settlement, at
least the WTO dispute settlement has insulated itself from comparably expan-
sive claims by restricting access to that approach to governments, at least as
claimants, through panels that are dominated by individuals with government
ties, and by adhering to interpretations of the guarantees of the WTO that
largely reflect the political consensus reached among members in the course of
prior GATT rounds. So far, the WTO dispute settlement has been as accept-
able as it has been to members because WTO panels have not dared to suggest
that trade is a human or corporate, as opposed to governmental, right. Perhaps
the WTO's lack of access to both multinational enterprises and to NGO's, at
least as claimants, is a virtue, at least as it has protected that regime from
claims as destabilizing as Loewen's claims may be to the NAFTA regime.
Now, at present, many of us in this room are probably not thinking about
multinational enterprises. We may be learning that not everything can or
should be resolved via hard fought or high profile litigation. We may be learn-
ing that even our own courts may be delegitimized if we ask them to solve all
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problems, even highly contentious political issues that are not subject to preex-
isting law, and it may be that multinational enterprises will need to learn the
same lesson at the international level if we are to build legitimate forms of
international dispute settlement that will actually stand the test of time.
Whether one regards the multinational enterprises that I've described here in
their sins of omission and commission as due to endemic collective action
problems or simply because of the fact that they are ignorant with respect to
the new international regulatory environment that they find themselves in,
what we should realize is that the rise and fall of the Multinational Agreement
on Investment suggests caution before we conclude that these enterprises,
which are of course the primary agents and beneficiaries of globalization, are
really ready for globalization's methods of regulation.
So my own conclusion based on this narrow case study is that even when
it comes to pursuing their own rather short-term, perhaps, corporate interests,
the jury is out on whether multinational enterprises are good global corporate
citizens.
Thank you.
MR. CONE: Our next speaker is James Gunderson. I won't introduce
him, and I failed to mention while he's threading his way to the podium, I
failed to mention the obvious, that we really want to encourage discussion
once the four speakers are finished, so I hope you all have questions, and I
hope we will have discussion. Jim.
MR. GUNDERSON*: Thank you, and good afternoon everyone. I'll be
coming at this from a little bit different angle.
I won't be speaking for Schlumberger, the corporation that I work for, but
a lot of my views are shaped - - I've been working with Schlumberger at least
seventeen years now, so my experiences with the company has shaped a great
deal the way I look at things. It's not as well known a company as many
others, so I'll say a few words about it, not so I'm speaking for it, but so you
get a chance of the perspective I've had in my work in the last few years.
Schlumberger is a very global company in the sense that it operates in
dozens, probably 70, different countries. Our largest business area is oil field
services, providing technology and services to the petroleum industry. We
also have a much smaller but significant business serving utilities, really more
like we do in the oil field, helping them gather information and process and
use that information, and we have another group of businesses that include
testing, equipment for testing microprocessors, that we provide to the semi-
conductor industry, and something that many of you may not be very familiar
* James L. Gunderson is Secretary and General Counsel of Schlumberger Limited, Secre-
tary of the New York Chapter of the National Association of Corporate Directors, an honorary
lecturer at the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at the University of
Dundee, Scotland, and Vice Chairman of Schlumberger Excellence in Educational Development
(SEED), a non-profit initiative that promotes internet connectivity at elementary schools in de-
veloping countries.
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with, but we're very excited about, which are smart cards, these microproces-
sor cards used in phones and things.
So it's a technology-driven business. We have about 55,000 employees,
revenue of about $8 or $9 billion, and our management complexion, like the
complexion of our employees generally, somewhat matches the places where
we work if you think in broad terms of continents around the world. Our
board, our top management, and the management of the various operating sub-
sidiaries tend to be quite diverse nationally, and we don't think of ourselves as
a company as a national of any particular country, but do think of ourselves as
a multinational.
So I guess the reason why we're not as well known as many companies is
we serve companies. We provide technology and services to companies rather
than to the public, so we're not that involved in big promotional campaigns
because brand recognition is important with our customers, but not so much
important with the public.
So what I'd like to do is talk a little bit about what I think global corpo-
rate citizenship means and what it means to be a good global corporate citizen.
It is an exciting topic right now. It's something that, I mean, I not only get
into discussions with my family, my friends, the people I work with, the orga-
nizations that I work for, but one is reading about it, and there is really some-
thing going on right now that I think has a lot of interest in what corporations
are responsible for, and I think many companies are thrusting themselves
through publicity campaigns right in the center of this question of what's good
global corporate citizenship.
It's easy to forget, but I'd like to think from time to time how different
things are today than they were back in 1974, when the UN's Economic and
Social Council formed that committee - - I'm not sure whether it was Com-
mittee or Commission on the Multinational Enterprise or Transnational Enter-
prise, and that was an era when it was the governments of developing
companies that were really anxious for a regulatory regime to protect them
from the sort of invasive nature of multinational enterprises, and it was really.
The sources were in the developed world that were questioning this sort of
thing, and today, I mean, we have the same debates going on, but the players
seem to have changed.
You have governments for developing countries very anxious for the de-
velopment benefits of multinational enterprises, but you have NGO's very
concerned, local communities very concerned by the impact on a local level,
and you have developed country governments, I think all over the map, de-
pending on the political balance within those countries.
I do think things have changed quite a bit in the last quarter century, and
particularly I think, and what I'd like to talk about a bit, is what's changed
from the corporate point of view, the corporation's view of what its citizenship
obligations are or ought to be. We don't really find today, unlike a quarter
century ago, many major multinationals that are trying to emphasize that all
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they're interested in or should be interested in is maximizing profit for their
shareholders and are denying any interest in other stakeholders. I mean, I
think we've moved beyond that. There may be retiring CEO's who feel this
way. I don't really think the people who would be replacing a retiring CEO
who feels this way would be as likely to think that way as perhaps a quarter
century ago.
In the program, there's a short Texaco article' about a few months ago,
and I have to say that Texaco is thinking, and not because they're in the midst
of some corporate reorganization of their own. I think Texaco has been active
in more affirmative notions of corporate responsibility than that article re-
flects, but I like that article because what it says in a five year time frame, as
opposed to a 25 year time frame, is a corporate view on equal opportunity for
employees, health, safety and environmental awareness, companies' relation-
ships with constituencies, and from that standpoint, a relationship not really
saying what they should be doing with those other constituencies and philan-
thropic programs.
I think today we all have a sense that these aspects of global corporate
citizenship are so well aligned with business interests that there's not much to
argue about. I think it's pretty easy to see today why companies should be
concerned about their employees and good employment policies - health,
safety, environmental - and why they have to pay attention to the other con-
stituencies today.
I think there is a big shift that's going on right now that's very interesting
for people within companies, and you know, if you'll excuse me, it's a little bit
like those inflection points you hear about in Silicon Valley where the rules
are sort of changing and people are trying to figure out what the new rules are.
Particularly, management is trying to figure out what the new rules are.
But before I leave, let me go over a little bit of what I think is sort of
generally accepted and given within corporate circles. I mean, the idea that
one would be trying to create or thrive as a global enterprise and have double
standards for your employees, or from a health, safety, and environmental
standpoint, that you would engage in what's sometimes called regulatory arbi-
trage, and you would do awful things where you could get away with it and
only do appropriate things where you were afraid of being prosecuted. I really
find it difficult to imagine good management today thinking along those lines
and not thinking a little bit more long term. Today, you have to be recruiting
everywhere. Again, I'm from a technology company perspective. It could be
quite different in other industries, but for us to get the people we need, we
have to recruit everywhere. I mean, the Indian Institute of Technology or the
engineering institutes around Beijing, they're vital sources of recruiting for us.
I mean, to sell our services and products to people everywhere, and our cus-
tomers are everywhere, we're operating everywhere, and you just - - every-
10. See Texaco and Social Responsibility, DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, May 1999 at 1.
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where is our home as a multinational enterprise, so you can't really pick and
choose that you're going to bet the future of your company on this market at
the expense of all these other markets, or on this place to recruit at the expense
of all the others.
So I think there again is a very close alignment between being a good
citizen, trying not to do harm, and taking care of your employees. That and
general business interests. Nobody wants to work for a bad company, and
nobody wants to, no company wants to be a bad company.
So where I think the most interesting part of the debate today, at least
what is I find the most active area of questioning going on within business
organizations is what I'll call affirmative civic duty, you know, the duty to be
doing good as opposed to avoiding doing bad. This is where this inflection
point is. I mean, I'm in discussions with different companies, including Tex-
aco, about how we are going to address this and what is it that we're going to
do. How can we be positive in these, in other areas, besides what we're accus-
tomed to, which is really doing our business well and maximizing profit and
that sort of thing?
I think a big part of the change going on, and probably the simplest to
describe, is that corporate philanthropy today is not as exciting a subject for
companies struggling with this. That's really associated with promotion and
marketing. I think people understand why companies get involved in philan-
thropic causes, and you often in discussion have to stop the conversation and
say, 'look, we're not talking about giving to good causes; we're talking about
doing good as a company that is presumably good at doing things.'
I don't believe it reflects the inflection point or this change in the rules
really reflects a change of opinion of top management in big companies as
much as it reflects a change in the way companies are being managed. Inno-
vative people in large enterprises are not waiting to be told to try to do some-
thing to address the world's global issues. They're moving in that direction as
part of a broader cultural change our society is going through today. Upper
management is in many cases watching this going on. I think good manage-
ment is trying to channel these, this drive within organizations, and I don't
know how long this is going to last, but right now companies are very con-
cerned about what they consider their up and coming or highest potential peo-
ple, very concerned about keeping them motivated and keeping them
channeled within the organization, so finding ways to allow them to pursue
things like this that mean a lot to them is very important for management.
So, I believe companies have an affirmative civic duty to be trying to find
what they should be doing to address what I think of as the big global issues:
the issues that are so big today that we're all worried about and that we don't
really see any institutions out there that we think by themselves are going to be
able to address them.
Now, I don't think we can expect every single multinational enterprise to
take on every major global issue threatening the planet. I don't think many of
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them are going to be very good at addressing many of them, and I'm not
talking about some massive redirects of capital and all the inefficiency that it
would entail.
What I believe is that it's part of a global corporation's civic duty to
figure out which of these big, daunting, global issues they are close enough, or
are related enough to what they are good at, that they can include those issues
in their general strategic planning. I mean, this is fairly clear and I think is
fairly well-observed in the environmental field.
Like a lot of companies, just to take an example from the company I
know, Schlumberger, our attention to the environment was really stimulated
back in the early 1980's when we acquired some companies, particularly one
in the semiconductor industry, that have really been doing some very serious
polluting. And so we felt bombarded by a lot of regulation, by a lot of cleanup
problems, and by a lot of issues we didn't feel we had caused. Lawyers are
dominating the activity. It was very defensive, very negative. I mean, it was
producing an introversion on these issues, and we kind of along the way, like
many companies, we've come a long way to being in an area that's quite
positive today. It took time, but today in our research, in our technology cen-
ters, in the field, people take a lot of pride when they are rolling out environ-
mentally friendly services and technologies. We've gone way beyond
responding to regulation. I mean, there are still things for the lawyers to be
doing, but we're really striving today to bring value to our customers and a
better environment for our employees. It's positive, and it's harnessing crea-
tivity within the organization, and that's the kind of synergy with a global
issue that companies should be recognizing and pushing because they have - -
there are business reasons to do that, from a motivational standpoint, but it's
just the right thing to do and I think an organization is a healthier organization
if it can do and articulate ways it's trying to do the right thing.
Almost all multinational enterprise activity relates to some kind of wealth
creation, and I think the world or much of the world or many parts of the
world look to major corporations as a best source for promoting entrepreneur-
ship, particularly local entrepreneurship, that many view as essential to ad-
dress the poverty gap and the problems of poverty and development.
Just an example of how a company in its global strategy should then
incorporate poverty and development in its thinking, when it's searching for
the best recruits, like I said we do at Schlumberger. We do it everywhere.
Our management system should be emphasizing local decision making. This
helps promote local talent that will be available. I mean, a person may spend,
to take the Schlumberger example, four to six years in their Schlumberger
career. Many will go back because there's a lot of pride in many developing
countries among people who do have an experience in a well-run multina-
tional, learn skills, learn management, develop their management abilities, and
want to go back and be successful entrepreneurs in, whether it's Nigeria, Bra-
zil, or wherever.
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And when companies sort of give a little bit more emphasis than they
might otherwise in emphasizing local decision making, and when they're
adapting products and services to local markets, that should take place locally
in marketing, local technology centers, or local joint ventures. This is a big
change in the way I at least do my work. There was a time when, in a local
joint venture with a local partner, you looked at that local partner - - this is a
lawyer speaking, not an executive speaking - - you looked at it, and you
wanted to minimize, really, the sort of hassle associated with having this local
partner. You didn't want any interference in the way you're doing business.
A very negative approach, I think at least I have learned, is not a particu-
larly good approach from a business standpoint. Today, I think companies are
much more interested in applying the same governance, corporate governance
principles, to its joint ventures with partners than are operating in their compa-
nies generally because there is a reason why good governance produces good
companies.
The whole point is to have it be a well disseminated, well understood
goal of the company and a goal of all of its employees to want to earn a local
reputation everywhere the company operates as a force of good. Now, one
example that's in the program, SEED, the Schlumberger initiative to connect
underprivileged schools in developing countries to the Internet. Schlumberger
has been a leader in remote connectivity for a very long time, and we're very
good at it, and when local managers get their remote offices hooked up and
then turn to hook up, you know, they've gone through a lot of learning.
They've got some expertise and know-how in getting a set of offices in Bali
Popon or some remote part of the world hooked up, and then turn and do that
for an underprivileged school in the area is an enormous motivational thing
among the local employees. And this got started by a local manager, this kind
of coincidentally with one of their midlevel executives in headquarters, having
sort of the same idea at the same time. They got very active. They did the
first SEED without top management even knowing about it within the organi-
zation, and then it caught on. There was a lot of enthusiasm among employees
who, because Schlumberger is a place where you move around and your fam-
ily is living in one country and then four or five years later living in another
country, have a great desire for connection to where they are.
So this really caught on with Schlumberger in a strong way. You'll see
when you look at the SEED booklet in the program. We obviously didn't have
a PR firm help us with our booklet. It's obviously a home grown thing, but
it's a powerful thing for the organization, and we don't have a clue today how
it's going to translate into anything commercially beneficial, but we just know
it's a good exercise.
Companies not only need to be contributing significantly to local devel-
opment. I see SEED helping with local connectivity, with schools, that's help-
ing education, that should help future economic activity, and SEED is also
very active in trying to connect elementary school children in different parts of
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the world through a website, and it's easier for companies to find ways to do
good on the development side.
The sustainable part, I think, takes a little more effort, a little more think-
ing, and a little more creativity. And when I say sustainable, you've got pov-
erty as one of the global issues, greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss,
water shortages, fisheries depletion, and these huge, huge issues that seem
beyond what any institution can deal with. It's not always obvious where
companies should apply themselves. For example, although oil companies are
associated with global warming, I'm not sure they're well placed. I'm not sure
that's where they should be, claiming that you are going to be a company
that's been very good at defending, finding, and developing oil, that you're
going to be good at developing alternative sources. I don't know. Maybe it
works, maybe it doesn't. In our case, I mean, global warming, I see it anyway
on the consumption end. Petroleum is not necessarily the problem. You may
need a lot of hydrogen for some of the proposals for fuel cells and that sort of
thing. It's burning, it's using the petroleum that creates the problem, so maybe
it's car companies as opposed to oil companies.
But as a company in the industry, Schlumberger, we're a leader in the
technology for finding, evaluating, and managing oil and gas reserves. Many
of our employees who are very concerned about global warming ask the ques-
tion or are demanding when we have gatherings, what's our position, what are
we doing. It's a source of debate, but the global issue that a group of our
management actually got off the ground, and again sort of a grass roots rather
than a top down decision, was water shortage. A few years ago, a group of up
and coming managers initiated a startup business to adapt Schlumberger tech-
nology that's finding oil in the ground to finding, evaluating and managing
water resources.
Now, I don't think there's anybody from that group here, so I can speak
frankly. I don't see the remotest chance of that business producing a profita-
ble activity in a very near term. If we were using the same measures for that
activity that we use for many of our others, it would have been killed a long
time ago, but it is important to these up and coming managers, so it's impor-
tant to us that the company is pursuing it.
So, because of that, we're actually creating an incubator to help nurture
and sustain projects and get more ideas from the organization that don't have
to have anything to do with sustainable development or doing good things. It
could be anything, but it was a spark for what I think was a good direction that
the company should be going, and it was also good because you always, in the
end, find the passover to promoting good business practice.
I don't think we would have our incubator for crazy high tech ideas that
we have today if it wasn't for this initiative that was more driven at the time
by managers from developing countries that knew of water shortage as the big
problem at home, and they wanted this big company they work for to be doing
something about it or playing a part there.
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So that's kind of this view I have that companies are going to need to
stretch a little bit to be good corporate citizens, from what I'm calling this
affirmative or active civic duty context rather than the other aspects of it,
which is not doing harm and taking care of your own, which is obviously
important as well.
I must say I just can't resist referring you to the back of the program
materials where I really like this chart, which you'll see at almost the next to
the last page. It looks like this, if you want an image of what it's like for
someone in my job to be coping with social responsibility. It's in the very
back, almost the last page of the book, and you have what I grew up with,
which is business ethics and compliance programs preventing harm, avoiding
risk, I mean, a very internal protective thing and you have next to it corporate
social responsibility efforts, positive force, gaining added value, external envi-
ronment, and being more extroverted. This is what is happening right now, I
think, and I like this image because people like me who are used to this left
hand stream are having to get off of our behinds and working on the right hand
stream. Most people that I'm working with within the organizations I work
for see these as belonging together and actually see that we put them together.
I had gathered some of the executives together and asked them very leading
questions about some of these kinds of issues to get them to talk, get them to
express their opinions, and from a compliance standpoint, being able to pre-
sent a company's programs with a positive face to them, is actually very good
for getting the people out in the field to listen and it made compliance pro-
grams more effective.
So as a lawyer, it's actually a positive thing.
Now, I'm going to say something that probably will strike some people as
a little strange, but in part you can look at it as a reaction to Professor Alva-
rez' s question of whether we have dropped the ball as multinational companies
in not having played our part in the great international political arena in terms
of what should be the rules, the legislation out there governing international
activity. In my little paper in the beginning of the program, I probably carried
it a little too far, but I used this analogy to individual citizenship of how can
we understand corporate citizenship. There is one aspect where that analogy is
very inappropriate. I don't really feel comfortable at all with corporate partici-
pation in the political process. I think running through the program and run-
ning through the concerns of people in my family, friends, and people I work
with is this notion that there are these enormously powerful organizations that
are applying a lot of the resources that I believe should be applied to value
creation and wealth creation. They're applying them to the political process,
both at home and abroad, in a way that I think makes it hard for us to imagine
how are we as a group of different players in this global community are going




I find it surprising that there isn't more energy coming from civil society
at trying to insure that corporations are more where they ought to be. I mean, I
believe corporations have a great deal - - large enterprise - - I'm using cor-
poration as sort of an abbreviation for large global enterprises. They know a
lot, there's a lot of talent, a lot of technology, they can contribute a great deal
to debate. They can contribute a lot of information, and it's a very big gray
area between that exercise and lobbying, inviting yourself to testify before
some hearing versus waiting to be asked and that sort of thing. And I don't
have the faintest idea how one would go about trying to better regulate large
enterprise involvement in the political process, but I don't, I mean, from my
days in law school when I first heard that corporations had First Amendment
speech rights, which I found very puzzling at the time, this notion of corpora-
tions as citizens in the sense that they should have an active - - I mean, the
notion that my chairman and CEO should somehow be representing me as one
of the employees of his organization, he should be determining the political
point of view of our company, I find a little bit strange. So that's one part of
the debate.
I hear and sense a lot of unease about the size and power of global mul-
tinationals and what seems to be happening behind closed doors and what
they're doing, but I don't see that being channeled into campaign reform and
improvements in the political process, but that's an area of very little exper-
tise. We have a very clear policy in Schlumberger. It is forbidden in any
country for any employee to make any donation to a political party or to a
politician or a political group in any way that could be mistaken for a Schlum-
berger donation. It's a wonderful rule. It simplifies things immensely in terms
of making sure people are doing things that benefit our shareholders rather
than these large kind of - - I mean, we have - - we are blessed with not
having big parts of our organization having to worry about legislation, which I
think is a beneficial business characteristic of our company.
So those are my observations. Thank you.
MR. CONE: We now have Rick MacArthur, who will speak to us.
MR. MacARTHUR:* Hi everybody. I usually speak with notes, but I
had my pupils dilated this morning, and the ophthalmologist promised me I
could see, and I can't. So you'll have real broad, broad brushstrokes.
My book is about NAFTA, but it's a way of getting into the way, quote,
"free trade" has been sold and globalization has been sold in the United States
to the American people. And as you can tell by the quotation marks around
* John R. MacArthur is publisher of HARPER'S MAGAZINE, author of SECOND FRONT:
CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA IN THE GULF WAR and SELLING OF "FREE TRADE": NAFTA,
WASHINGTON, AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, a writer for the NEW YORK
TIMES, NEWSDAY, WALL STREET JOURNAL, BOSTON GLOBE, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, Los
ANGELES TIMES, PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER, THE PROGRESSIVE, AND THE COLUMBIA JOURNALISM
REVIEW, founder and board member of the Death Penalty Information Center, the MacArthur
Justice Center, and Article 19, the International Center for Censorship based in London, and
board member of the Committee to Protect Journalists.
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"free trade" in the title, obviously I don't think it's being sold on the up and
up, and the basic point you need to understand is that NAFTA is not a free
trade agreement; it's an investment agreement, or a labor exportation agree-
ment, between the United States and Mexico, or it's a hoax, as Richard
Gephardt put it so succinctly, and the expropriation insurance aspect of
NAFTA which the international lawyers are even more expert on than I am, is
an absolutely crucial feature to the NAFTA agreement. It's what distinguishes
NAFTA from the Canadian-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1988,
which if you just compare the expropriation clause, you'll see that the United
States is much more concerned about Mexican expropriation than they are
about Canadian expropriation, and this of course stems from the 1938 nation-
alization of oil in Mexico by the current Cardiness's father. But as an investi-
gative reporter, which is what I am, I try to do investigative reading, which is a
term I picked up from the great political writer, Walter Carp, great late politi-
cal writer, and if you read the book or get into it, you'll see that my reading
takes me into interesting areas.
Now, but just to summarize what happens in the book so you know what
I'm talking about, if you're talking about corporations as global citizens, my
corporate citizen is called Corporate Brands Acco, which owns a subsidiary
called Swingline Staplers that used to operate in Queens and was shut down
two years ago, or a year ago essentially and moved, lock, stock and barrel, to
Mexico. The reason for moving, of course, was that the average wage rate in
New York was about 11 bucks - $10.54 an hour - 11 bucks an hour average,
and the average wage right in Mexico and Nogales is a dollar an hour, and my
corporate citizen is a labor racketeer. The way corporate citizens along the
Maquiladora belt operate is there's a local Maquliadora association, the man-
agers in these towns all meet on a regular basis, they all know what each of
them pays the other, and each pays its employees. There is an understanding
between the CTM 11, which is the national labor union in Mexico, and the
government. They've simply switched allegiance now from the PRI12 to the
PAN' 3 led by Vincinte Fox, which is that nobody gets a raise unless the union
agrees to it, which means nobody gets a raise unless the government agrees to
it, and one of the paradoxes of Mexico is that the local corporate citizens pay
slightly above the Mexican minimum wage. They don't have to, but they do,
and it's good politics because it keeps the CTM from giving them a hard time.
But essentially, the CTM is engaged in a labor racketeering scheme with
the Mexican government, with the local employers, and with the United States
Border Patrol, because in all of these discussions about free trade, which in-
credibly ignore politics for the most part, what's not discussed is the simple
fact that there is no labor mobility allowed in NAFTA or guaranteed in
11. Confederacin de Trabajadores de Mexico (Confederation of Mexican Workers).
12. Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party).
13. Partido de Acci6n Nacional (National Action Party).
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NAFTA, and if you read the works of David Ricardo, which nobody's read -
- none of the politicians who espouse so-called comparative advantage have
ever read Ricardo - - or even if you are a follower of the teachings of the
great English radical Richard Cobden, you realize it has nothing to do with
free trade in the sense that they conceived it, which assumed a certain amount
of labor mobility, or what is permitted in the European community.
Now, that being said, I'm not entirely hostile to free trade theory, espe-
cially in the Cobdenite sense. George McGovern, in my book, talks very elo-
quently about the advantages to corporations which know no flag, which are
not nationalistic, and the advantages that can and sometimes do accrue to their
employees in foreign countries, because it's true that in some foreign countries
the corporations are treated better by the foreigners than by their domestic
employers.
That being said, you have to understand that the corporate citizens are not
going to these countries in order to be nice, nor should they. I don't believe
that's their responsibility. They're going because of the cheap labor, and what
NAFTA does and what PNTR 14 does, the more recent manifestation of free
trade propaganda, what they both do is lock in low labor wages and protect the
host. The companies within these, to some extent, protect the companies
within the foreign country from expropriation.
Now, I don't want to go into great length about this because I want to get
the discussion going, but I would like to make a couple of observations about
the way you should, the way I think you should, look at this issue of globaliza-
tion. One of the observations I made, and this is where I part company with
left wing critiques of free trade and globalization, and right wing, to that ex-
tent, is I think the left in this country, and possibly in Europe, still cling para-
doxically to the notion that foreign countries that exploit or mistreat their
employees, or rather - - see, I'm falling into the same rhetoric - - mistreat
their citizens, can be reformed through corporate citizenship, good corporate
citizenship. You'll hear it all the time that free markets lead to democracy,
free markets lead to reform, that the process of globalization is ipso facto a
process of global liberalization, political liberalization.
I think that's preposterous, and the reason I think it's preposterous is I've
seen the way Mexico operates close up, but I also think it's preposterous theo-
retically, because the idea that you're, and we talked about this at lunch, the
idea that you would ask the plant manager of Motorola in whatever province
in China he or she happens to be operating in to militate for human rights or
for higher wages is preposterous. It's literally not their business. If they want
to sort of go off on an independent career of human rights agitation or labor
union organizing, of course they'll find themselves kicked out of the country
very quickly or hauled back by management, which went to these countries in
14. Permanent Normal Trade Relations.
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the first place in order to avoid the sort of strict, what used to be strict, labor
law in the United States, and environmental regulation.
And on the question of sovereignty, again, I think it's overstated by both
the right wing nationalists represented by Buchanan and what you would think
of as left wing, I suppose, critics like Nader, even though I like Nader very
much, because when push comes to shove, we simply in the United States
simply abrogate treaties. My favorite example being the trucking provision of
NAFTA. We should have allowed Mexican trucks into the United States as of
January 1st of this year. That's guaranteed under NAFTA, but of course the
Teamsters Union said, "If you do that, we're not going to endorse Gore," and
Jimmy Hoffa, Jr. said very clearly, "I'm not endorsing anybody until I have
assurances that this portion of NAFTA will be abrogated." Right now there
are no Mexican truck drivers driving in the United States, and it's just not
going to happen.
It's a blatant abrogation of NAFTA, and the Mexicans are going through
the motions of complaining about it, but as Gephardt has pointed out, the
NAFTA side agreements and tribunals are-well, I shouldn't say the side
agreements, but the NAFTA tribunals are not very effective mechanisms for
getting your way if you're not happy with one aspect or another of NAFTA.
Now, I just would make one other point about our friendly corporate
citizens here. You should also know that in the history of NAFTA, NAFTA
was not received well by the business community initially. Precisely because
American business smelled a stealth liberal globalization strategy by, I sup-
pose you could say, by the environmentalists, by labor unions, by Richard
Gephardt, because they thought, quite rightly, that the left or the liberals would
like to tack on all sorts of other social agendas to a trade agreement, which
isn't even a free trade agreement. They had to be bludgeoned into it to some
extent by the internationalists in the business round table. We're talking about
the companies that really do live on free trade, American Express, or free
investment, free movement of money across borders, Kodak and General Elec-
tric. There aren't very many pure multinationals in the United States, but they
had to be talked into it, and they were talked into it, paradoxically or ironi-
cally, by a Democratic administration that recognized that free trade, in quotes
again, always in quotes, "was a great fund-raising technique," and you will see
now today that there is literally parity between the Democratic Party and the
Republican Party in terms of soft money contributions. This is largely due to
the fact that Bill Clinton understood that NAFTA was a great way to raise
money. He talks the talk, the international peace and globalization and de-
mocracy, so on and so forth, but his principal motivation in pushing NAFTA
and presenting himself as what they call the new Democrats, was fund-raising,
and you could see the instant increase in soft money contributions to the Dem-
ocratic Party once NAF'A passed. Companies like General Electric and
American Express, which gave virtually nothing to the Democratic Party, sud-
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denly they're giving as much or more to the Democrats as they gave to the
Republicans.
I would also just make the point about the race to the bottom being a
misleading - - again, I'm piling on the left, because they should be my natural
allies, and as a good skeptical reporter, I like to beat up on my allies first. The
race to the bottom is a misleading bit of rhetoric because it implies competi-
tion. It implies corporations duking it out worldwide for the cheapest, best
labor. And when I go to great lengths to explain, and I show in the book that
this is the last thing corporations want, they want a controlled labor environ-
ment, they want stability, they want level playing fields within a country, and
they don't want their companies being raided by other companies in the local
Maquiladora town or the local commune in China. They don't want anybody
raiding each other, other than people here want companies raiding their best
employees. They want stability, and they want a level playing field, so it's not
really a race to the bottom. It's a plea for maintenance of the status quo, as
long as the host government will permit it.
I just quickly gave you a couple of examples of things, interesting things,
that are happening in the NAFTA world. You may have seen the story about
the California case where a company that was organized in Southern Califor-
nia, a U.S. company, was instantly shut down, and the company decided to
move it to Tijuana. The National Labor Relations Board went into court, I
think federal court, to stop the company from moving to Tijuana on the
grounds that this is a violation of the Wagner Act.
So when you talk about international law or international standards
trumping national law, this is an example of national law trumping NAFTA,
and for now the ruling stands. The company can't move to Tijuana. I have
not heard of a comparable case. I don't think there's much hope for the labor
movement, of course, because companies are flooding south in search of cheap
labor. If you're a factory manager or factory owner, you'd have to be crazy
not to take advantage of the controlled labor market in Mexico or China. It's
too good a deal to pass up.
Then I would just also bring your attention to a recent Human Rights
Watch report that was released, I think in the last two months, that talks about
violations of international law within the United States. And I would say that
while I am concerned about sovereignty on a theoretical basis like the Nader-
Buchanan people, I still say that NAFTA, because it's clear that NAFTA and
to some extent GAT[ trump the Wagner Act, you can't automatically assume
that the sovereignty argument or the sovereignty problem is the principal prob-
lem here. I'm beginning to think more and more that these are strictly national
political problems; they're not global political problems. As I pointed out, the
principal motivation for the Democratic Party to support NAFTA or for Clin-
ton to support NAFTA is because he can raise more money from corporations
than he can raise from labor unions. It's a simple arithmetic decision, and I'll
just leave it at that. Thank you.
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MR. CONE: I'll ask Professor Steven Ratner to be our final speaker,
and then we will go to discussion and questions. Professor Ratner.
PROF. RATNER*: Thank you very much. It's a great pleasure to be
here today. I think I may need my water, since I'm struggling with a cold.
The last decade has witnessed a striking new phenomenon in interna-
tional strategies to protect human rights, a shift by global actors concerned
about human dignity from nearly exclusive attention to abuses committed by
governments to close scrutiny of the activities of corporations, and in particu-
lar transnational corporations. Now, claims that corporations have a detrimen-
tal impact on human welfare are of course as old at least as Marxism and have
always been a mantra of the left worldwide, but today's assertions are quite
different. They come not from ideologies with a purportedly redistributive
agenda, but from international organizations composed of both rich states and
poor states and from expected NGO's like Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, whose very credibility turns on avoidance of political affilia-
tion, and in making these claims, these states and these organizations are mak-
ing claims based on widely ratified and widely accepted notions of human
rights, and I'll just give you a few examples before I get into my talk of the
sorts of claims that are being made.
The United Nations Security Council condemns the illegal trade in
diamonds related to Sierra Leone and asks private diamond corporations to
establish a regime to label diamonds of illegitimate origin. The European Par-
liament calls on the European Commission to develop a multilateral frame-
work, including a binding Code of Conduct for European corporations. The
U.N. Human Rights Commission establishes a working group on the methods
and activities of transnational corporations. Human Rights Watch establishes
a focus group on corporations and issues lengthy reports about Texas-based
Enron Corporation, Shell, Mobil, and other corporations of complicity in
human rights abuses in India, Nigeria, and elsewhere.
The U.S. Government oversees the creation of an apparel industry code
of conduct in response to public concerns about violation of labor rights. And
lastly, citizens of Burma and citizens of Indonesia sue Unicol and Freeport-
McMoRan in U.S. courts under the Alien Torts Claims Act, alleging human
rights violations, although they lose both cases.
So what we have witnessed in these last two decades are strong claims
being made by human rights groups without, in my view, any standards for
judging them. Corporations have tended to respond by either denying the ap-
plicability of duties or denying the facts, and what I am trying to do in the
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course of a paper that I'm writing is to try to offer a theory under international
law that would address the question of what sorts of human rights obligations
corporations have. And I'd like to summarize that paper or that project in
three parts today. First, by asking why we might want to hold corporations
responsible for human rights abuses, secondly, how we would do it, and third,
what implications it might have for international law.
I'll say before I even start that I believe quite firmly that any kind of
theory for talking about corporate responsibility and human rights has to be
overtly grounded in international law and not in parochial notions of individ-
ual governments or individual states like the United States. And so I don't
give much weight to the cases now going on in the United States under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, and I believe that one has to look at international law
notions because the top multinational corporations are all based outside the
United States. Most of the top five are all based outside the United States, as
are most of the top 25, so I think one has to have an international and not a
U.S. approach to this problem.
Secondly, I very much want to start with what I believe is a nonbiased
position, neither pro- or anti-multinational corporation. The only thing I'm
pro is pro-human rights, and so I think it's necessary to develop a theory that
doesn't get into the merits of whether or not Human Rights Watch's accusa-
tion is right or wrong, and the facts I leave to somebody who actually knows
or has been to the various countries where these alleged corporate violations
are taking place.
Okay, now, why corporate responsibility? Historically, and I think Mr.
Gunderson went into this to some extent in his talk, there's actually been a
dynamic between the relationship between north and south, between the rich
capital exporting countries and the poor capital importing countries, on the
way multinationals should be treated. First, we had the Colonial era where we
have a dynamic characterized by the rich states essentially controlling the poor
states. They weren't even states back then; they were colonies. Multinational
corporations were in a sense agents of the exploitation, and this lasted from the
1600's roughly through the war. After World War II, we have the period of
decolonization, and what we see is a demand by newly independent countries
for political, juridical, and economic equality. The U.S. accepts the idea of
juridical equality, and the poor states start demanding economic equality by
expropriating the assets of the multinational corporations, by calling for some-
thing called a new international economic order in the 1960's and '70's, and
by demanding codes of conduct on corporations that they were concerned
were violating their law. And there were some notorious episodes of corporate
violations by ITT and by United Fruit that perhaps gave the Third World rea-
son for concern.
Today, in this sort of globalization phase, we are seeing a sort of counter
reaction to that, which is that much of the developing world sees that multina-
tional corporations have a big role to play in economic development. There's
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a huge increase in foreign direct investment. The rhetoric of the 1960's and
'70s, about how a new national economic order is replaced by this network of
bilateral investment treaties that Jos6 talked about that give many guarantees
to corporations, including the right to go to international corporations. So
whereas corporations used to be concerned - - whereas, I should say, host
states used to be concerned that multinational corporations were not comply-
ing with host country law, now they don't care as much about that or they've
changed their law to in a sense accommodate the corporations. The result is
that we see accusations by NGO's that the corporations are in fact working
together with the government somehow to violate human dignity, or perhaps
the corporation itself violates human dignity, so the problem is changed essen-
tially from complaints that multinational corporations violate host country law
to complaints that they obey host country law, but they thereby ignore interna-
tional standards.
Now, the typical response of my discipline and Jos6's discipline is to treat
these issues as what we call areas of state responsibility. In other words,
human rights is something that creates duties for states. States are responsible
for not abusing the rights of their people, and they pass domestic laws control-
ling private actors, but what those private actors do is not really within the
ambit of international law. And I argue, I believe after having done some
work on this, that this is not enough, that if indeed corporations represent a
new loci of power, as Jose assumed, we can't just rely upon states to control
the activities of a corporation.
First of all, the corporation may not be an agent of the state, and even if it
is an agent of the state in some respects, it may not - - it may be desirable or it
is desirable to target international legal norms towards the parts that are best
able to control the offending behavior.
Now, is there any precedent for this, this idea that we could have interna-
tional law putting direct duties on entities other than states? Well, in fact
there's lots of precedent for it. In the human rights area, there's a whole area
of law known as international criminal law that goes back to the Nuremberg
era, which says that individuals have certain duties in the area of human rights,
that individuals cannot commit certain grave violations of human rights, and
there's a whole corpus of international law about what individuals can do and
can't do, and targeting the individual is now seen as necessary to protect
human rights, that targeting the state is not enough.
Outside the area of human rights, international law has already sort of
crossed the Rubicon, as it were, and said that nonstate actors have direct duties
and even that corporations have direct duties. International environmental law
has lots of or several, probably about five or ten, treaties that say that polluters
are directly liable for certain environmental harms. International labor law has
rules on labor standards with respect to forced labor, with respect to child
labor, with respect to other things. There's a new international regime on
bribery which places direct duties on corporations. I'm sure Mr. Gunderson is
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involved in making sure his company stays clear of the law on this. There's a
whole - - there's a new international bribery convention that says that corpo-
rations cannot bribe foreign governmental officials or they will be held crimi-
nally responsible for it. On top of this, corporations already have rights in
international law. They have the right under the NAFTA and under the bilat-
eral investment treaties to go to arbitration. They have the right under human
rights law to make claims against governments for violations against free
speech and other rights. So corporations already have rights. They already
have duties, and what I'm suggesting is we need to talk about those duties in
the human rights area as well.
Now, if the notion of state responsibility is not sufficient, in other words,
if I argue going after governments is not an effective way to police the behav-
ior of corporations because corporations may not be governmental actors or
because the government may not have control over them or other reasons, why
not just go after the individuals in the corporations? Why not just say, well,
the president of this company that's been somehow implicated in the human
rights abuse should be individually responsible under international law? Well,
there's a short answer and there's a long answer. The short answer is in fact
international criminal law actually holds individuals responsible for a very,
very small number of crimes. Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
the kinds of crimes that corporations are not typically involved in, in my view.
Not the kind of things frankly that the NGO's are accusing corporations of.
The longer answer is, in fact, holding a corporation responsible accom-
plishes certain goals that individual responsibility has not. Any of you who
have studied any theories of corporate law, corporate liability, know that the
reason that we allow individual private suits against corporations and even
individual criminal complaints against corporations is because penalizing the
corporation for conduct by its officials is seen as having a useful deterrent
effect, a useful controlling effect as compared to going after individuals. So I
think we can see corporate responsibility as a response to the ineffectiveness
of both state responsibility and individual responsibility.
Now, how could we conceive of holding corporations directly responsi-
ble? Well, I'm trying to, as I say, sort of build a framework here, which looks
at, which has sort of two main pillars to it. First, what I call the sort of sphere
of influence of the corporation, and second, the kind of human rights that the
corporation could conceivably be in a position to violate. Now, what do I
mean about the sphere of influence of the corporation? Well, the sphere of
influence component is actually composed of several different factors. First of
all, I think that a corporation's duties in the area of human rights are first a
product of the corporation's ties to the government. That is, that all other
things being equal, the closer a corporation has ties to the government, the
larger are its duties in the area of human rights.
But how strong a tie are we talking about? Are we saying that any time
they meet together or talk together or work on a project, that therefore the
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corporation is responsible for anything the government does wrong? Well, I
think we have to be a little more careful than that, and in fact, international law
provides some answers to this question. If, for instance, a corporation were
somehow to receive instructions from a government to commit some kind of
human rights abuse, if the government were to ask corporate security officials,
employees of a corporation in a particular area, to assist the government in
roughing up political opponents or something like that, international law
would recognize that the government is liable and it would recognize, I think,
that the corporation is just as liable as the government.
International law recognizes the idea of complicity, that there is in fact a
duty on private actors and on states not to be complicitous with each other in
violating human rights. So that if a corporation is, as I say, if it's lending its
equipment to the government for putting down a political rebellion in a way
that might violate human dignity, or if a corporation is lending its personnel,
which again, these are accusations that are being made by groups like Human
Rights Watch, then we can talk about the corporation being complicit in the
human rights violations of the government.
Indeed, it's even possible to talk about the possibility - - that's redundant
- - it's even possible to think about the liability of the corporation for acts of
omission. If, for instance, the government has handed over a large tract of
land to a corporation to essentially sort of have kind of a de facto governance
in that area, and the corporation does not sort of follow up on what the govern-
ment might do in that territory, which is again one of the accusations that is
being made against Freeport-McMoRan regarding Gary Injia, one could talk
about the corporation being responsible under well-accepted theories of corpo-
rate responsibility.
The second factor with respect to the sphere of influence of the corpora-
tion is what I look at as the nexus of the affected populations. When it comes
to states, we know who the right holders are. The citizens of a state, basically
the residents of the state, are the people who have human rights that the gov-
ernment has a duty to respect. It doesn't work that way with corporations.
Corporations don't operate in that same sort of neat, territorial way, and we
need to have a sense of who the right-holders are, whose human rights can a
corporation violate, and I would say that all other things being equal, the more
control a corporation has over individuals, the more duties it has towards
them. So we can talk about the difference between the duties of a corporation
towards its employees, towards its employee's family, towards the people over
a territory that it might be able to affect through pollution or to affect on the
quality of life, and we can even imagine decreasing amounts of duties as the
population gets further and further from the ability of the corporation to con-
trol it.
The third factor I would look at with respect to the sphere of influence of
the corporation is who in the corporation is actually - - if there's something
wrong that is happening, some complicity with the government, potentially, or
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some other violation of human rights, who is doing it? Is it being done by an
employee of the corporation? Is it being done by a contractor? Is it being
done by a supplier, a joint venturer? There are all these complicated corporate
relationships.
As you know, some of you follow the Apparel Code of Conduct. It
wasn't that Kmart was supposedly violating workers rights. It was what some
subcontractor of Kmart did, or some subcontractor of a subcontractor of Kmart
was doing it. Well, how far do we want to go up and down the subcontractor
chain to say it's a little too far from Kmart to hold Kmart responsible? This is
a difficult question. I would say it would turn for the most part on the corpora-
tion's control over the person committing the abuses. A contractual relation-
ship might be evidence of this control, but it might be neither necessary nor
sufficient, and you would have to make a judgment call as far as contractors,
subcontractors, subsidiaries, or suppliers as to whether or not their activities
can somehow be attributed to the corporation as a whole. I think it's far-
fetched to say that every single person in the supply chain of a multinational
corporation, if they happen to commit a violation, that it's the responsibility of
the multinational corporation. I think that's extending a theory of moral culpa-
bility much too thinly.
Now with respect to the issues of the rights at issue, which was sort of the
second pillar of my theory of corporate responsibility. Human rights law in
fact poses many different duties on states: the duty to prevent violations from
taking place, the duty to educate governmental officials to insure that human
rights aren't violated. Let's say it's the fight against torture. You have to
make sure that governmental officials don't torture people, you have to make
sure they're educated so that torture is prevented, and you have to make sure
victims of torture have a remedy. There's all sorts of corporate duty that
human rights law places upon governments. I wonder and I question whether
all of these duties can simply be transferred to a corporation. The fact is a
corporation has a different stated purpose in life than a government does, at
least liberal government. I think one of its main purposes is to protect the
human rights of its citizens. This is not, let's face it, the principal purpose that
corporations exist. They exist to generate economic wealth, both generally
and for their shareholders, and I would say that to talk about imposing a broad
range of duties on corporations is quite unrealistic, and what I would focus on
is a duty on corporations to avoid direct infringement of human dignity.
Now, what do I mean by direct infringement of human dignity? I would
say that corporations have, that the duties of corporations are highest, when it
comes to their ability to have a direct impact upon the sort of physical, mental
well-being of individuals, and that their duties are to prevent that from, to
prevent those basic human rights from being undermined. And so a corpora-
tion should, for instance, insure that its managers don't inflict corporeal pun-
ishment on the employees, insure that it doesn't result, it doesn't conduct its
activities, in a way that would eliminate the only supply of drinking water to a
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population, but because those are activities that have a most direct effect upon
human dignity. I would say that a broader set of duties is on corporations with
respect to, say, a duty that they have to go out and promote human rights.
They have to promote human welfare in an affirmative way. I think that's
great corporate policy as Mr. Gunderson said, but I would not say that they
have a legal duty to engage in that sort of conduct.
I would prefer that the NGO's focus on the extent to which corporations
are involved in somehow undermining human dignity in the most direct sense
and place duties on them to prevent that sort of behavior.
So, in a sense, what my theory turns on is the answer to three questions:
Who is violating the right, who within the corporate structure? Whose right is
being violated? How close to the corporate activity? And what right is being
violated, the difference between, let's say, the right to physical integrity and
some other human rights which might be less important human rights? And
essentially what I build or what I'm trying to build is sort of two sets of duties
from all of this. One is what you might call complicity-based duties, that is,
duties not to cooperate with the government when it is violating human rights,
based on certain degrees of proximity with the government, and secondly, a
set of duties not to directly infringe human rights itself, not to become a viola-
tor of human rights. What I'm trying to do and my thinking about this is kind
of testing this against some of the claims made by NGO's, and if you want
during the question and answer period, I can talk about this some more, but for
instance, we could test this theory against the claims being made against Enron
by Human Rights with regard to human rights abuses in Maharashtra State,
India. We can test this against some human rights allegations by NGO's
against some apparel manufacturers, and I think what we will do is see some
of these claims might raise legitimate human rights concerns and some of
these claims don't.
How could we implement this kind of a theory? I don't have time to go
into a whole lot of detail, but there are four or five different ways in which we
can imagine this theory of corporate responsibility being implemented. First
of all, as a process matter, I would say this kind of theory has to be done in an
open, transparent sort of way involving human rights groups, corporations, and
governmental representatives. This can be done on a national level by em-
powering government agencies to monitor corporate conduct in a way they
haven't done before. Right now, we monitor them for violations of securities
laws. We could empower the Department of Labor to monitor them for
human rights practices based on data coming in from the State Department,
perhaps. There are a whole lot of regimes. We already used the criminal
method with respect to anti-bribery on corporations, so there's a range of
machinations we can contemplate.
There are a range of international regimes we could contemplate through
a treaty that could create a binding code of conduct. I'm not sure we have to
go that far. We can talk about informal, nonbinding codes of conduct. Right
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now there are some very, very vague codes of conduct out there that have been
passed by the - - have been adopted by the OECD and the ILO. 15 Basically,
they say things that corporations should protect human rights of the people
affected. There's something of my theory in there when they talk about the
people affected. I think that's the same as saying the people are under their
control or within their sphere of influence, but that's not exactly detailed gui-
dance that the General Counsel of Schlumberger or somebody else would want
to give to his people in the field.
So I think we need to think about variety of international fora that could
flesh out more detailed obligations of corporations in the human rights area.
This could be done by, and this would need to be done by, international insti-
tutions that have credibility with states, with NGO's, and with corporations.
There are international organizations that have credibility with some, but not
others. OECD has plenty of credibility with states and multinational corpora-
tions, but not any with the human rights NGOs. The UN has plenty of credi-
bility with the human rights NGO's, but none with the corporations.
So we have to look at other possibilities that include rich states and poor
states, human rights NGO's and multinational corporations.
In addition, we can contemplate this being done outside of a sort of for-
mal legal framework entirely, simply by asking the NGO's to use sort of
clearer standards in their accusations being made against corporations. As I
say, it has sort of framed the debate in more sort of legal terms so they can put
reasonable legal expectations against corporations. Finally, the corporations,
of course, can implement this theory themselves by taking the codes of con-
duct that a number of them have and making them more detailed with respect
to the human rights issues and taking the compliance issue a bit more seriously
than has been done to date with respect at least to the Apparel Industry Code
of Conduct. So essentially my idea, at least I think, is trying to represent a
challenge to a number of communities and areas of the law. It's a challenge to
international law to more directly regulate nonstate actors, as Jos6 talked about
in his introductory remarks. It's a challenge to human rights law to focus not
just upon the state and, by the way, I'm not suggesting that corporations com-
mit more human rights violations than states. I think that's ludicrous. The
fact is that NGO's are absolutely right to continue their focus absolutely on the
state, which is the entity with the most resources and most capability of com-
mitting human rights violations, but I would say that human rights law - - I
think the NGO's are ahead of the law in this sense. Human rights law needs to
recognize that violations of human dignity can come from other actors besides
states.
I hope my proposal represents a challenge to the corporations themselves
to in a sense stop trying to have it both ways, to stop trying to be the recipients
15. International Labor Organization.
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of rights under the BIKs' 6 and rights under human rights law, but to recognize
that they are also the holders of duties, that if they have the power they are
increasingly having and if they enjoy the power to impinge on human dignity,
which some of them apparently do and a few of them apparently have, then I
think it's incumbent on them to recognize duties in this regard.
And finally, I hope my idea is a challenge to the NGO's themselves to
focus their claims against corporations on those that really violate human
rights law, and to sort of avoid the anti-multinational corporation rhetoric that
seems to plague many of them. And ultimately, I guess in that sense, my goal
is to sort of help end the dialogue of the deaf that I think is now taking place
between NGO's and corporations, and to focus their concerns on legitimate
human rights issues in the hope that corporations, like states, will be able to
improve their practices in this area. Thank you.
MR. CONE: I hope we'll have some questions or comments. Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This has to do with the relationship between
legitimate human rights questions that Professor Ratner talked about and af-
firmative civic duty that Mr. Gunderson talked about. A person from Mars
coming and listening to the panel would believe listening to one that maybe
the main area of human rights of concern might be economic, social, cultural
rights, sustainable development rights, environmental issues and so on, and
listening to the other might say, oh, Professor Ratner seems to be echoing the
rather limited mandate of many great human rights organizations, including
Human Rights Watch, which has blistering reports on corporations, primarily
civil and political rights issues. My question, then, to these two gentlemen and
to the whole panel, Professor Alvarez as well as Professor MacArthur, is that
the way ultimately to put all this citizenship together, isn't it important to
regard both sets of human rights and both approaches legal, going to certain
kinds of legal codes and new developments on the one hand and the concern
for affirmative civic duty, reading the UN development report and looking at
growing gaps and wondering about corporations' impacts on marginalization.
Isn't that also important?
MR. GUNDERSON: I think it's a very good point. I guess I would
draw one distinction, which is I think the kind of accountability, legal account-
ability that Professor Ratner was talking about, is, as far as corporations are
concerned, better suited for the human rights area to - - you have a natural
phenomenon - - I mean, I'm one of these people that believes from my own
experience that companies that actually operate, particularly service compa-
nies and technology service companies actually operating on the ground in a
developing country, do naturally find themselves at odds with regimes that are
trying to restrict human rights of the sort that relate to information, for exam-
ple communication, that sort of thing, and a company that cannot operate the




employees are doing in order to operate. It doesn't believe it's operating in a
way that it thinks is appropriate. It shouldn't be there, I believe, in that
jurisdiction.
To ask it to be going much further than not violating human rights is
likely to put it - - you heard my unease about the corporate role in the politi-
cal process, and I think you're inviting corporations to maybe get, you know,
offering foreign corporations to get involved in what I think are local political
issues, but I do feel that I missed a very important, or did not emphasize, a
very important subject in the human rights area, and I think it is that when
human rights are being violated, as compared to many of the other things
we're concerned about, I guess I would tend to think that's sort of the first
order of business, to make sure human rights are not being violated. I don't
know if that addresses your sense of dichotomy. I think it's a little bit saying
it was just lacking in my presentation.
PROF. RATNER: I think you're absolutely right. I think one of the
problems with some of the economic, social, and cultural rights is that, be-
cause of the nature of these rights, the standards are not what one thinks of as
strict. I mean, the fact is that the way the covenants are worded, they give
states much more leeway in terms of what they're allowed to do. They recog-
nize human development.
Let's take a classic economic right, the right to a fair wage. You look at
the ILO conventions on the right to a fair wage. They don't say the worker in
Burma has to get paid the same as the worker in Germany. They basically say
a fair wage is one that's consistent with local practices, that you, even the
minimum wage convention, the ILO, which I can't even remember whether
it's widely ratified, you know, gives great deference to local practices, and so
to say that corporations have to comply, have to comply with these economic,
social, and cultural rights, I think they should. I just don't know how far it
gets you because in fact, the treaties give so much leeway anyway that I don't
think that saying corporations have to respect economic rights is going to sat-
isfy an NGO that's upset about wages in Guatemala.
You know, there are obviously some issues that cross the line. When you
get to factory safety questions, you know, is this a civil and political right? Is
this an economic, social, and cultural right? Well, it's a little bit of both,
depending on how grave a threat to your physical integrity. That's why I
come back to physical integrity being the touchstone on this. But I do agree
with you that economic, social, and cultural rights are an important element of
this. The problem is that there's less consensus about what some of these
things mean.
MR. CONE: Yes, ma'am?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm interested in what role, if any, you see for
Truth Commissions, especially in this period where transnational justice has
become certainly a keystone of our foreign policy, political science depart-
ments, government departments, et cetera. I'm thinking specifically of the
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example of the Truth Reconciliation Commission of South Africa which was
the only one to look at business accountability of human rights violations, the
only Truth Commission out of the previous 17 or 18. At the same time, the
Commission in fact did not have any leverage, they couldn't offer amnesty,
they couldn't punish for any violations, and secondly, they did not use interna-
tional law, whether it's the ILO standards or the ICCPR 17, or other treaties and
conventions guaranteed by trade unions, economic wage, et cetera.
But I'm interested in this historical period of what possibility you see to
use this mechanism for accountability and under what circumstances.
PROF. RATNER: Is that for me?
MR. CONE: You've been elected.
PROF. RATNER: Well, I've read large parts of the TRC report, but I
didn't know they had discussed the role of corporations in it, so I appreciate
you bringing it to my attention because I teach and write a lot on this area of
accountability. I think it's a great idea. I think, of course, the problem is that I
think that the bulk of the Truth Commissions saw the primary instigator of
human rights violations as the government or in some cases the opposition, but
principally the government if you look at Argentina, Guatemala, Chile, the
obvious cases where there have been Truth Commissions. Certainly to the
extent that corporations might be complicitous under my theory, a broader
theory probably as adopted by the human rights NGO, narrower theory by the
corporations themselves, I think they're appropriate targets of the accountabil-
ity that comes from shedding light that Truth Commissions offer, and I think
that's actually an interesting way in which their activities could be brought to
light, if in fact they have become complicitous with the government.
Again, it would really depend upon what the relationship is. I am not
advocating - - in fact, I'm advocating the opposite, that the presence of a
corporation in a country that violates human rights makes the corporation lia-
ble for those violations or complicitous in them. I don't buy that theory of
agency or connection. I think that's a stretch. I think some human rights
NGO's do believe it, and I think frankly, on one occasion at least, the interna-
tional community as a whole basically bought it, which is during the Apartheid
era. There was a sense that no corporation should invest, but I think that was
an unusual case.
The fact is, I'm not willing to assume that kind of guilt by association.
But if in fact there is evidence of complicity, I think a Truth Commission
would be an excellent mechanism to shed light on it.
MR. CONE: I just venture to point out that the "R" in "TRC" was
"reconciliation," and so there was, I think, quite an emphasis on amnesty in
order to enable the Commission to work at all.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Absolutely. But the amnesty provision specifi-
cally applied to individual perpetrators who requested amnesty, both the state
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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and the liberation movements, and did not apply to the collective entities,
which is the problem which business presents because the Commission tried to
look at not just business, but what health care did under apartheid, what the
media did, the legal profession did, et cetera, et cetera. So it didn't provide the
same kind of leverage that was set forth here. It kind of talked about the issues
of let's look at the truth in terms of what do we do about it now.
MR. CONE: Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I had a question which was directed at Profes-
sor Ratner primarily, and that is the sort of bifurcation between this idea of
direct infringement on human dignity and these affirmative legal duties. That
follows on the last question, and it made me a little bit concerned that some
other form of, sort of, indirect infringement which is not merely affirmative
which is left out, which is precisely the issue of participation within the politi-
cal process. That is, thinking of something like Article 28 of the Universal
Declaration, the right to international and social order in which all rights could
be realized could be eroded by, for instance, the Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
ers Association of America making it incredibly difficult for sublicensing
countries, and also perhaps even blocking technology transfer through restric-
tive copyrights, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and this seems to me also on Mr.
Gunderson's, I think this is very much something which is on the minds of
NGO's and also human rights NGO's, and they're starting to look very much
more at these sort of negative duties to refrain from harm, but they're indirect
negative duties; they're not simply duties to simply not pollute a river.
PROF. RATNER: That's a great question, and I'll be honest with you.
You're raising a problem with my theory in challenging it as being too limited,
and the reason that I sort of took the take I did today is because the last time I
presented this, the first time I presented this paper, which is about two weeks
ago, a week and a half ago, at Columbia Law School, somebody gave me a
hypothetical showing me how it was too broad and here is the hypothetical,
which is, if I'm going to say that corporations have duties and respect to all
civil and political rights, which is sort of my take on this problem, would I
then be saying that if a corporation fired an employee for publicly criticizing
the company and for publicly, you know, saying the product that they pro-
duced was a piece of junk or coming or that the competitor's product was
better, that they were therefore violating the individual's right to free speech,
and I'm not. I think that's kind of a far-fetched claim to make, so I'm not
saying that.
But I do think you're right insofar as it is possible to imagine the corpora-
tion working with the government through bribery or other mechanisms in a
way that would undermine other political rights besides those most closely
associated with physical dignity, like the right to political participation that
you mentioned, so I think it's a very good question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It seems to me that there's a natural conflict
between a multinational corporation trying to produce wealth and the interests
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we have in human rights on an international level. Somebody has to figure out
how much wealth will you give up to protect how much rights, and the prob-
lem now is that we need rules to control multinational enterprises. We need
multinational rules to control them, but there is nobody that can weigh these
two interests and come down with fair rules that balance the rights against the
lost production.
Would anybody like to talk on that?
PROF. ALVAREZ: I think that's an excellent point, and I think we used
to have one place, and that's the international courts. The problem we have
today is you have these lesser developed countries anxious to get foreign in-
vestment, and they're the ones that are going to be the least likely to be able to
do a fair trade-off on this, and I think Steve alluded to that basic dilemma. So
what we have is a regulatory gap. Where we used to have both the host states
of these foreign investors and to some extent the home states exercising their
control power and their trade-off through their national courts, we now have
the potential gap of no one doing that, hence Steve's point of trying to come
up with an international regime of various types.
I guess I'm skeptical that we'll be able to reach that plateau, which is why
I'm actually quite supportive of the Alien Tort Claims Act approaches, be-
cause as I see much of international law, much of it developed from precisely
national attempts like that, and of course what we're talking about are paro-
chial attempts. When we look at these Alien Tort Claims Act involving corpo-
rations, what do they do, they reach for 1983 and they look at analogies to
1983 and I just pulled out one of the cases and what do they say? When is a
corporation responsible as a state actor for human rights violations? Four
tests: The joint action test, which asks whether a private party is a willful
participant in the joint activity with the state. The nexus test, which asks
whether there's a close enough connection between the challenged action of
the defendant and the state so that the action may be fairly treated as state
action. The public function test, which asks if a private party's exercising
powers traditionally reserved to the state. And the state compulsion test,
which examines whether the private actor's actions were actually compelled
by the state.
Parochial to be sure, this is 1983. But if enough states develop under
their own parochial law, we might reach the stage of actually getting to the
stage that Steve suggests, and so I think what we're left with is the possibility
of groping for a variety of places to go after the corporation, including in U.S.
courts, even when they have nothing to do with the U.S. That is, the tort did
not occur in the United States, but there is some personal jurisdiction connec-
tion that you can make.
These cases to date have not been successful. I'm not so sure that has to
be the case. I think there's a prospect for that to change and I will say I will
draw some comfort from the fact that other countries around the world are
starting to take a second look at the Alien Tort Claims Act approaches, and I
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think things like the Pinochet precedent and how that prompted the Chilean
court to investigate their amnesty laws suggests there's a way of these things
to communicate trans-boundary connections without having an international
treaty or a conscious attempt to make international law on point.
MR. CONE: In the back?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Ratner mentioned that the UN does
not have credibility with business, whereas the OECD does. What is the
panel's opinion on the recent launch of the global compact mechanism
whereby the UN and business will cooperate? There's a launch of the UN
with approximately 50 multinationals around the world to launch - - there are
now 300 such companies affiliated with global compact.
What do you think of this as a mechanism to spread human rights, envi-
ronmental rights, and labor rights?
MR. GUNDERSON: I would like to make a comment with respect to
the global compact. I think the credibility of the United Nations with the mul-
tinational sector has risen dramatically. One of the very interesting things
about the global compact is it's not just another code of conduct or something
like the Sullivan Principle that you're supposed to adopt. That is important,
but more important is the forum that the global compact process has provided,
where you have a very good, and I don't know this directly - - I know this
from colleagues more than any direct activity that I'm familiar with, but the
sense I have from companies participating is that the ability to be sitting down
with representatives of organized labor, NGO's, as I understand it, under sort
of UN kind of auspices to keep everybody talking is an extremely positive and
useful thing to be going on, and these multiparty initiatives that I have to say I
don't know much about. What I'm more impressed with is how much positive
comment I hear about organizations like the Forestry Stewardship Council sort
of defining what is good forestry or the World Dam Organization trying to
define what is the right way to build a dam.
These are all modest, but very positive kind of multi player cooperation
groups that are more important than the codes themselves, and I think in the-
ory the OECD's contact points are supposed to accomplish the same sort of
thing, but I hear more about the global compact than I do the OECD compact.
MR. CONE: One could overstate, Jim, the credibility of the OECD in
the business community.
Yes, ma'am?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In contrast to the cost of human rights, it seems
to me there are a number of ways that human rights actually can be of eco-
nomic benefit to corporations. For example, universal primary school educa-
tion in Taiwan is often touted as one of the bases for its current success, it's
level of development. Is there any research being done into the positive eco-
nomic aspects of implementing human rights?
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MR. GUNDERSON: Sorry to make - - I'd like to make kind of a
tangential comment, which is that, and this is partly my own problem of the
perspective I have.
Outside of certain basic manufacturing sectors, a lot of the activities of
multinational companies in countries is actually a virtuous sort of cycle with
human rights, in the sense that the game is more productivity than it is low
wages. There's a lot of sense, I think, that people think you go where you
have low wages, and there are companies that do that, but a lot of the compa-
nies you probably think of when you think of big multinationals, they're not as
interested in low wages as they are productivity gains, and what produces
productivity, much of what produces productivity in a work force, I think you
would find very close correlations to what you would consider beneficial from
a human rights perspective in an environment.
So, I mean, certainly, I mean, it's - - the SEED program I mentioned is
not to develop good elementary schools so we can ultimately hire these peo-
ple. We're not that forward looking, but certainly at a secondary education
level, we are concerned with programs in Kazakhstan. We're concerned with
who the universities are bringing in and what they're doing to make sure they
have people for engineering programs, because we're going to need those
engineers.
So I think there's a lot of correlation between human rights and what
companies ought to be wanting on the ground.
PROF. RATNER: I'd just make one more, I guess, tangential comment
from a different tangent, which is what you're talking about are the way coun-
tries are guaranteeing economic, social, and cultural rights - - I mean, educa-
tional rights in this context. Of course, that's part of a very, very big debate
between developing world countries and the west about which of these rights
are more important, about sort of a cultural relativism debate about whether
economical, social, and cultural rights are more important or civil and political
rights.
Hidden in the question is the question of causation. Do you need great
elementary education in order to have civil and political rights, or do you need
civil and political rights first? And of course the west says you don't need to
spend a lot to protect civil and political rights, and then some Asian leaders,
I'm not so much sure about Asian citizens or the Asian NGO's, but some
Asian leaders say, no, no, no, no, no, we have to focus on educating our people
first and we can't afford to give them civil and political rights.
It's a classic Singaporean claim, less in Korea and Taiwan now that
they're more democratic. But this whole question of what impact education
has on human rights gets to big questions about which causes which to hap-
pen. Do you educate? Do educational, social, and cultural rights promote
civil and political, vice versa, or are they working independently?




AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just wanted to make a very brief comment in
terms of what you said made me think about it. The one piece of this argu-
ment that we're talking about as to why corporations are trying to do certain
things, or what are the benefits of social economic conditions to corporations,
stability, et cetera. The other piece that I think maybe the gentleman talked
maybe getting to the UNTP report is part of the reason we're in this situation
is the whole, the failure of the structural adjustment programs, and the fact that
the failure has been so bad, particularly in Asian and African countries, and
the standards, and there's been a direct relationship between a loss in the stan-
dard of living in health care, housing, et cetera, and the amount of money that
has to be paid out by a government to service the loans, all the stuff about the
heavily indebted countries, heavily indebted poor countries, Jubilee, et cetera,
et cetera.
I think that's an important factor because that's influenced the need for
corporations now to approach some of these theories of openness and making
democracy work, dealing with education, health care, et cetera, but we're talk-
ing - - I just realized it seemed to be missing from part of what we're talking
about, but I think it's part of the context.
MR. CONE: I think in response to that and in conclusion, we've actu-
ally covered an amazing amount of territory. I think that each of Professor
Alvarez, Mr. Gunderson, Professor Ratner, has in fact presented a program
that could have been a stand alone program, and that we've managed to have
all three of them have the interaction, have the audience response that we had,
I find very satisfying, and I want particularly to thank each of the three of you
for a really superb contribution and let you know that I and others in the room
are very grateful.
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